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This thesis will explore the question of what the literature says about religion in China, 
the beliefs of DePauw students, and their religious practices. I will argue that, as the literature 
suggests, many Chinese students do not self-identify as religious, but have beliefs associated 
with traditional Chinese religions. The existing literature will be supported from findings in 
student interviews that provide evidence that many students say they do not have a religion, but 
believe in religious elements such as karma, or have participated in religious activities such as 
ancestor worship. I then will argue the reason for this disconnect can be explained by analyzing 
the impact of early Chinese scholars whose writings were influenced by the Western influence of 
the term “religion” as well as the pressure to modernize through secularization. Furthermore, I 
will demonstrate that a psychological analysis allows us to understand how religious elements 
have become embedded into Chinese culture, and therefore embedded into the average Chinese 
psyche. Finally, I will argue that the interconnected nature of traditional Chinese religions is an 
important component of why individuals do not typically associate with one specific religious 
tradition. Overall, this thesis will argue that these elements combined have influenced the low 
rate of religious self-identification and the common phenomenon that individuals say they do not 
have a religion yet believe in religious elements or have participated in religious practices. 
Before presenting these findings, I will provide a historical and political background about 
religion in China. Chinese religion’s historical and political past have led many scholars and data 
collection organizations to assume that China is full of irreligious people. In order to debunk the 
myth of irreligion in China, I will first present the case as to why individuals have concluded 
Chinese people have no religion, and I will argue that this conclusion is wrong by discussing the 
current literature. Finally, I will further support the debunking of this myth of irreligiosity with 
data collected from student interviews.  
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Academic studies that focus solely on Chinese student religiosity are sparse. However, 
one survey in particular conducted by Fenggang Yang of Purdue University is the most 
comprehensive and thorough study of Chinese international student religious beliefs and 
practices. As part of Purdue’s Center on Religion and Chinese Society, Yang and his team have 
conducted two major studies, one in 2016 and one in 2018. While the surveys also include 
questions about how Chinese students perceive democracy in the United States or their social 
media use, a large portion of his findings are regarding the religious beliefs and practices of 
Chinese international students at Purdue. Since his study is the most recent and thorough survey 
of this specific group of individuals, it was in great part an inspiration for this thesis and 
provided avenues for further investigation. The goal of this thesis is to provide a historical and 
political background to the religious situation in China, while analyzing the relationship between 
DePauw student interviewees’ religious self-identify, the beliefs they hold, and the practices in 
which they engage. In order to do so, students were asked both about their beliefs and practices 
to further understand their complex relationship. Furthermore, as a means of further 
understanding the influence of the Chinese government’s atheist political stance, I asked students 
what they remember learning about religion in school. This allowed me to negotiate the 
difference between the government’s stance on religion versus a slightly more tolerant attitude in 
the classroom. Yang’s study provides crucial numbers about Chinese student religiosity, but due 
to the statistical nature of the study, we are not able to understand the underlying reasons why 
students may respond the way they did. Consequently, the intent of this thesis is to understand 
the cultural context in which these Chinese students were raised as well as an attempt to gain a 
deeper understanding of the Chinese youth psyche. By conducting interviews, I was able to 
compare student responses to the existing literature and found that many responses directly 
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supported the findings of previous studies. Finally, I found there is a wide range of explanations 
for student responses, including a historical and political approach, a psychological approach, 
and a cultural analysis.  
 This thesis, while including a discussion of the religious beliefs of the wider Chinese 
population, focuses on youth, and more specifically on Chinese university students. As will be 
further discussed, Chinese youth are a critical group to study because they were raised in a new 
environment that has been understudied. Statistics collected by scholars Stark and Liu highlight 
the increased number of religious reporters in the early 2000s. An analysis of these findings 
demonstrates that it is not possible for a huge number of converts to explain this phenomenon, 
but rather a change in social stigma that caused more people to be comfortable reporting their 
religious beliefs. Chinese youth were raised in the social environment that did not have such a 
negative stigma against religion, so their attitudes towards religion may be very different from 
earlier generations. Since the attitudes and beliefs of Chinese youth are underrepresented, we do 
not have a full understanding of how the changing social environment has impacted the beliefs 
and opinions of Chinese university students. For these reasons, the experience and beliefs of 
Chinese youth are very important as they contribute to the larger discussion of Chinese religion.   
 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF CHINESE RELIGION 
 The following section will provide a background of major historical and political events 
and ideologies that have shaped the modern religious environment in China. To understand fully 
why the Chinese religious environment is typically perceived as atheist or irreligious, we must 
first understand the historical and political factors at play. Over the past hundred years, China 
has had a tumultuous relationship with religion, which impacted many Chinese people’s attitudes 
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toward religion and the government’s political stance toward religion. To add to the complex 
nature of religion in China today, we must also understand China’s long history of religion and 
the impact of these religions on Chinese culture. By evaluating history, politics, and traditional 
Chinese religions, we will more deeply understand the current religious climate in China.  
 
THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN CHINA  
China is one of the oldest civilizations on Earth with more than 4,000 years of recorded 
history. Officially known as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China has the largest 
population of any country in the world. While China is known for its achievements in technology 
and transformation into a socio-economic world power, it is also the birthplace of some of the 
great world religions and schools of thought, primarily Confucianism and Daoism. In addition to 
these two homegrown traditions, Buddhism was introduced to China thousands of years ago. 
Over time, the three main schools of thought became the framework for Chinese society as these 
religious traditions became deeply ingrained into Chinese culture. Each tradition grew on its own 
over thousands of years yet simultaneously intertwined with the others, causing the religion we 
see today to be “the product of continuous historical development from prehistoric times” (Adler, 
Chinese Religions). Chinese religions have been a crucial part of Chinese society for thousands 
of years, and their far-reaching impact is present in today’s culture and Chinese psyche.  
As will be discussed in greater depth in upcoming sections, China has faced multiple 
anti-religious periods that attempted to eradicate religion from society, leaving the concept of 
religion tainted with a negative stigma. Religious destruction during the twentieth century and 
the current Chinese government’s publicly atheist stance may lead some to believe that religion 
no longer exists in China. However, despite these factors, religion in China has rapidly re-
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emerged as more and more Chinese identify publicly as religious. In the words of Fenggang 
Yang, China’s religious revival in the last few decades has been “one of the greatest awakenings 
in human history” (Yang 565). Chinese religion has proved to be persistent, both institutionally 
and as a critical part of Chinese culture. China, with thousands of years of religious background 
and a history of anti-religious movements and atheist political ideology, is a unique case for 
analyzing religion. Although some scholars, such as Yang, have argued that China experienced 
and is continuing to experience a religious revival, there is still a perception that China is an 
irreligious country.  
 
CHINA AS AN “ATHEIST” COUNTRY 
 Assessing China’s political and historical background is crucial to understanding why 
many individuals have concluded that Chinese people are not religious. In order to break down 
this misinformation, we must first understand how the academic community arrived at the 
conclusion that China is a country full of atheists. China is frequently described as an 
“irreligious” or “atheist” country full of non-believers. While the government does have an 
official atheist stance and many Chinese people do not identify as religious followers, there is a 
greater sense of religion embedded into the culture than is visible on the surface. Many articles 
and journals emphasize this point by providing statistics about how few Chinese people say they 
are religious. For example, an article for the World Economic Forum entitled “Losing their 
religion? These are the world’s most atheistic countries,” the author cites a WIN/Gallup Poll, 
which states that only 9% of Chinese people are religious. She goes on to say that about two-
thirds of Chinese people claim to be atheist, making China the most atheist country in the world. 
Readers are left with the impression that next to no one in China has any sense of religiosity or 
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spirituality. In addition to this article, the map below shows a visual representation of the same 
WIN/Gallup Poll, this time published by The Independent. Interestingly, the first article 
interprets the poll as saying 67% of Chinese people are atheist, while The Independent article 
puts the range between 40-49.9%. This image makes it quite clear that a blanket label of 
“atheist” has been applied to China. Both are reputable news sources, demonstrating that both 
news sources and polling organizations have written China off as a country full of atheists. 
 
These examples are only a few of many journals, articles, and a variety of other sources that 
claim China is an atheist country with little to no religion. However, as we will see, believing 
that China has no religion, or no history of religion is a grave misinterpretation of the current 
situation. In fact, it has been a misinterpretation since Chinese scholars first began evaluating 
Chinese religion and culture due to comparing the Chinese context to the Western context.  
 
WHY IS IT BELIEVED CHINA HAS NO RELIGION? 
 The word “religion” is a historically and politically charged word in the Chinese context. 
The misapplication of the word “religion” began in the early twentieth century. One scholar who 
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aptly describes this series of events is Dr. David A. Palmer, professor at University of Hong 
Kong. He is one of the leading scholars in the field of the anthropology of religion with a 
specific focus on Chinese religion. Palmer explains the history of how the term “religion” was 
imported to China, and how it did not directly translate, which resulted in a commonly accepted 
scholarly perspective that China was not religious and had never been religious. When China and 
the Western world began interacting in the nineteenth century, many Chinese intellectuals began 
comparing the existence of religion in both regions. These scholars, with their understanding of 
what Western religion looked like--structured and organized--concluded that China was not 
religious because it lacked organized religion. Palmer references a very important Chinese 
scholar Liang Qichao 梁啓超(1873-1929), a leading intellectual of the time, who is known for 
being a Qing Dynasty historian, scholar, and politician. He was the scholar who imported the 
Chinese word zongjiao (shūkyō) 宗教 from the modern Japanese, where the term had been used 
to express the Western concept of religion (Palmer 18). He was heavily influenced by the 
Western and more specifically Christian understanding of religion, so when applying the idea of 
zongjiao to his own culture, he did not see the organized structure of Western religion, and thus 
concluded that “theological ideas, conceptions of an afterlife, or religious organizations in 
China” did not exist. Liang was one of the most influential scholars of his time, and his writings 
and thoughts on religion and Chinese culture directly impacted future social movements in 
China. In combination with other intellectuals, his ideology inspired the May Fourth Movement 





THE NEW CULTURE MOVEMENT  
 The problem of defining and understanding the concept of religion in China is key to 
understanding the religious environment in Chinese society today. In addition to the problematic 
outcome of using a Western definition of religion to analyze the religious situation in China in 
the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anti-tradition and anti-religious movements also 
painted religion in a negative light. The complicated relationship between Chinese culture, 
politics, and religion started primarily at the beginning of the twentieth century, which affected 
the attitudes of later political leaders and academics. For example, as was previously mentioned, 
thinkers like Liang Qichao published writings that inspired more young scholars to critically 
question Chinese society and tradition. The impact of these anti-religious sentiments on the 
youth is incredibly important because, as Fenggang Yang points out, youth have always been 
“the forefront of the great spiritual awakening that seems to be sweeping the vast land of China” 
(Yang, Youth and Religion, 147). The younger generations have always played a role in the rise 
and fall of religion, which makes them an important group to study. Thus, during the early 
twentieth century, religion was being questioned both in the way the word zongjiao affected 
academics and in the way traditional religion became politically charged.  
For centuries, China had been governed by Confucian laws until the final dynasty was 
defeated and the Republic of China was established in 1911. By 1915, some people were calling 
for a return to a Confucian-led dynastic system where Confucianism was the official state 
religion. However, in a popular magazine New Youth, young people attacked Confucianism, 
“blaming it for withholding China from progress, democracy, and scientific development, and 
calling it the religion of rites and proprieties (li jiao) as the religion of cannibalism” (Yang, 
Youth and Religion, 148). They were certainly affected by anti-tradition and anti-religious 
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thinkers like Li Qichao. Young people began to believe that Confucianism was the force that 
caused China’s problems, and for China to progress, Confucianism needed to be destroyed, 
including physical representations of it such as temples and Confucian schools. These young 
people began to band together, and eventually formed a large movement referred to as The New 
Culture Movement. While the movement first began with the purpose of removing Confucian 
roots from Chinese culture, their dislike for religion did not stop there. The New Culture 
Movement also targeted Christianity as it was believed to be the religion of Western colonizers. 
The New Culture movement, which was run by youth and intellectuals, eventually impacted the 
general public’s attitude toward religion. Since then, “it has become a norm for the modern 
intellectuals to be anti-religious. They have campaigned to clean up the society of superstitions, 
including all kinds of religious beliefs and practices” (Yang, Youth and Religion, 150). The 
leaders of this movement spread anti-religious sentiments not only through academia, but 
throughout society. The impact of the New Culture Movement is critical to understanding future 
anti-religious movements that shaped the course of Chinese history; more specifically, the New 
Culture Movement laid the groundwork for China’s most famous leader, Mao Zedong, and his 
party’s similar goal of eradicating religion from Chinese society.  
 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
 An exclusively atheist government and irreligious society became widespread under Mao 
Zedong’s leadership, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. 
Discussing the Cultural Revolution in its entirety is out of the scope of this paper, but its effect 
on society is critical to contextualizing the current state of religion in China. This movement 
effectively wiped out religion during the 10 years and resulted in a stigma against religion that 
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had long-lasting impacts, even to today. The Cultural Revolution was a societal movement 
intended to revitalize the Chinese spirit with a focus on re-energizing the youth for a new, 
stronger future. However, the idea of what belonged in the future and what should be eliminated 
from the past drove the policies of the Cultural Revolution. More specifically, Chairman Mao 
believed in destroying the “Four Olds,” otherwise known as “old ideas, old values, old customs, 
and old traditions” (Zuo 100). The goal of this movement was to remove traditional elements 
from Chinese society to make way for the implementation of Mao’s communist ideology. His 
demands resulted in the persecution of religious practitioners, the destruction of temples and sites 
of worship, and essentially wiped religion off the surface of society, so that “it was as if the 
religion of China had never existed” (Zuo 101).  
In addition to removal of the Four Olds, inspiration from Marxist doctrines also drove the 
persecution of religion during the Cultural Revolution. Karl Marx believed “human beings, 
having created God (or gods), elevate the divinity above themselves thereby falling prey to 
religious alienation and false consciousness.” For him, religion was “the reflection of human 
misery and a sickness of society. It was also the opiate of the people, a means used to justify the 
status quo and legitimate the current social order” (Zuo 100). As the new Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) took power, Chairman Mao implemented policies that aligned with Marx’s anti-
religious sentiments. Religion was believed to be superstitious, and instead the people should 
believe in and follow Marxist doctrines. When reflecting on growing up during the Cultural 
Revolution, Fenggang Yang remembers being taught in school that “God is dead” and “religion 
is gone” (Yang 567). Anti-religious rhetoric permeated every facet of the government and 
society as the Chinese Community Party attempted to completely eradicate religion.  
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Those who risked maintaining their religious beliefs and practices were “forced to 
practice in secret,” which led to the establishment of underground religious movements and 
groups. This mass movement to private and secretive worship led to the creation of underground 
religious movements. According to the Chinese Communist Party at the time, there were 
“effectively no recognized believers of any religion in China,” but many remained true to their 
beliefs covertly (Lamb). Thus, while there appeared to be no religion in China during these 10 
years, religion persevered in secret. However, while not the same as traditional religion, during 
this time many Chinese people turned to their leader to fill the void left by religion and acted 
very publicly in support of Chairman Mao.   
 
CULT OF MAO 
 While religion was banned and “no longer existed,” many scholars have discovered that 
Chinese people filled this gap through what is referred to as the Cult of Mao. For example, Yang 
states, “Ironically, while all conventional religions were eradicated from society, the personality 
cult of Chairman Mao climaxed during the Cultural Revolution” (Yang, Youth and Religion, 
152). Mao essentially became a god-like figure that was worshipped by the Chinese people.  
Yang describes this new form of religion as a “pseudo-religion.” He recounts his own experience 
growing up in China at this time and describes the impact Chairman Mao had on the youth:  
“The personality cult of Mao Zedong was prevalent. The Red Guards of Chairman 
Mao—the college or high school students who were loyal to Chairman Mao—would hold 
up the Little Red Book of Mao’s quotes and form the so-called hong haiyang (red sea) 
while chanting “long live Chairman Mao!” and performing the loyalty dance toward a 
Mao’s portrait or statue” (Yang, What about China?, 568) 
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During his time in power, the “Cult of Mao” acted as a quasi-religion in which Mao was 
presumed to be an eternal figure. Although traditional religions were removed from society, this 
new version of “religion” emerged, which demonstrates that people desired religion in some 
form, and found it by following both Mao as a figure and adhering to his teachings and ideology. 
Clearly, even if it was a new form of religion, the need to fill a religious void was persistent even 
during Mao’s time in power. However, on September 9, 1976, the Chinese people faced the 
devastating loss of their leader and had to come to terms with the fact that their god-like leader 
was actually mortal. Many people had become so convinced that Chairman Mao was a god that 
they were shocked when his death finally came. Yang remembers hearing people crying in the 
streets wondering how, “‘the great leader, the great general, the great helmsman, and the reddest 
sun in people’s hearts, Chairman Mao,’ died? Should not he live for 10,000 years or forever?” 
(Yang, What about China? 568). While this quasi-form of religion filled the religious hole in 
Chinese society for around a decade, upon his death that void opened up once again. Chinese 
people could no longer put their faith and hope into the Great Leader; consequently, a new 
opportunity for religious re-growth in China emerged. This new period of history resulted in a 
new chapter of flourishing religion both due to the desire to fill the void left by the disenchanted 
followers of Mao, but also because new leadership implemented policies that promoted greater 
religious freedom.  
 
CCP OFFICIAL POLICIES ON RELIGION 
After Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, the 1980s welcomed a new chapter of China’s 
relationship with religion. The effect of many influential scholars claiming China did not have a 
religion in combination with two major anti-religious movements, it is understandable why it 
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appears on the surface as though China is irreligious. However, when China’s new leader Deng 
Xiaoping came to power, the religious situation shifted significantly. The 1980s were a time of 
major policy change and religious freedom that had not been enjoyed for over a decade. When 
Deng Xiaoping came to power, not only were people left disillusioned by the Cult of Mao, but he 
believed in “open door” policies, which were economically based, but also impacted religious 
freedoms. In 1982, China adopted a new constitution, including Article 36, which “maintains 
freedom of religious belief” and also states protection of “normal religious activities” (Lamb). 
That same year, the Chinese Communist Party went one step further by issuing a document 
called “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist 
Period,” which is frequently referred to as Document 19. This document has been seen as an 
“astoundingly candid analysis of China’s religious crisis and the legal basis for China’s religious 
revival” (Johnson 27). It essentially admitted to the wrongdoings of the Mao regime and 
articulated the ways in which religion was attacked during the Cultural Revolution, documenting 
that the Chinese Communist Party “used violent measures against religion that forced religions 
movements underground,” and “fabricated a host of wrongdoings and injustices that they pinned 
upon these religious personages” (Johnson 27). Document 19 was a groundbreaking text that for 
the first time admitted to the Chinese people that violence had been used to take away the right to 
religious freedom.  
In addition to admitting failures of the Mao regime, the document officially granted the 
right to religious freedom and even detailed specific practices that had once been banned that 
were now permitted, stating that it was “permissible, either in places of worship or at home, for 
Buddha worship, scripture chanting, incense burning, prayer, Bible study, preaching, Mass, 
baptism, initiation as a monk or nun, fasting, celebration of religious festivals.” (Johnson 27). 
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Document 19 called for a return to the government’s relationship with religion that had been in 
place before Chairman Mao came to power and reinstated the five major religions approved by 
the government, including Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. While 
religious freedom has been officially granted since 1979, “the CCP in its official discourse has 
never given up its ultimate goal of eventual elimination of religion at the ultimate stage of 
society – communism” (Yang 25). Thus, Chinese people enjoy religious freedoms so long as 
their beliefs and practices align with the five approved religions; nevertheless, the government 
still believes that eventually religion will be removed from society. 
Overall, the CCP expressed their “regret for the past treatment of religious persons and 
organizations” and acknowledged “the complexity and longevity associated with religion and the 
crucial role religion plays in individual and societal development” (Lamb). Legally and 
politically, this document was the foundation of the religious revival in China. However, the 
tumultuous history of religion in China during the mid-twentieth century impacted how 
comfortable Chinese people feel about expressing their religious beliefs. In fact, most people 
“shun the word ‘religion,’ which is seen as a sensitive term, something extremely formal, 
hierarchical, and political. This results in colossal misunderstandings when outsiders try to use 
these terms to gauge religious or spiritual life in China” (Johnson 28). While religious freedom 
for followers of the government-approved five religions was reinstated, the social stigma 
associated with religion was still present as Chinese people recovered from an entire decade of 
religious persecution.  
After 10 years of adamant rejection of religion in all capacities during the Cultural 
Revolution, it is quite remarkable that the Chinese government publicly declared religious 
tolerance and apologized for its treatment of religious practitioners in the past. While religious 
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freedom and tolerance in China is far from perfect, a conversation that exceeds the scope of this 
project, the religious freedom expressed in the early 1980s has certainly impacted the number of 
religious practitioners in China today. Although Chinese religion has had a tumultuous past, 
China has entered a new era of religious tolerance and has reached an understanding that religion 
will inevitably be present in the lives of the people.  
All of this is to say that there are many factors that have combined to make it 
understandable why on the surface it appears that China truly is irreligious. The foreign origins 
of the term zongjiao does not identify with the traditional understanding of Chinese, causing 
Chinese and Western intellectuals to believe that China has no religion. Additionally, the anti-
religious sentiments of the New Culture Movement made way for an even more aggressive 
attack on religion during the Cultural Revolution. Given the decade of “removal” of religion 
from China combined with the Chinese Communist Party’s official atheist stance, one may be 
inclined to believe that religion in China is rare or even nonexistent. So far, we have analyzed the 
academic, political, and historical reasons why China is believed to be irreligious. By laying this 
groundwork, we are then able to debunk the myth of Chinese irreligiosity.  
 
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF CHINESE IRRELIGIOSITY 
In this section we will assess surveys and statistics that have attempted to understand the 
true religious situation in modern China. Surveys that accurately collect and report information 
have debunked the myth that China is not a religious country. We will also discuss why accurate 
data collection has been so challenging in the past; additionally, this section will consider how 
studies that approach the concept of religion in a way that is more relatable to Chinese people are 
much more successful. Accurate statistics have proven that many more Chinese people hold 
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religious beliefs than previously thought. It is critical to understand the extent to which Chinese 
religion still exists today to further analyze how these religious elements have become so deeply 
embedded in Chinese culture. The persistence of religion is necessary to understand the 
subconscious religiosity in Chinese culture, which has influenced the worldview of many 
Chinese youth. 
 
RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE IN NUMBERS  
China’s tumultuous relationship with religion in the 1960s to late 1970s makes it not too 
surprising that one of the first country-wide collections of data about Chinese religiosity 
occurred in 1997. However, this new period of collecting data on Chinese religion has brought 
two major findings: one being yet again the issue of using the term “religion” to collect 
information from Chinese people and the other being an increased willingness to report religious 
belief at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These questions have been brought forth by a 
study done by Stark and Liu, which will be explained more deeply in this section. In 1997, the 
first major collection was published in a white paper written by the Chinese government that 
claimed that there were “approximately 100 million religious believers and practitioners in China 
and outlines the various legal and judicial institutions set in place to maintain religious freedom” 
(Lamb). This white paper continued to acknowledge the faults of the Cultural Revolution, going 
so far as to say, it “had a disastrous effect on all aspects of the society in China, including 
religion” (White Paper). The document also demonstrates that religion was still present in China 
only two decades after the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, this first set of data began a 
conversation about the challenging and often problematic way information about religion in 
China is collected.  
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Surveys that have sought to collect data about the number of religious believers in China 
provide evidence for the growth of religiousness in China in recent years. A project by Rodney 
Stark and Eric Y. Liu compares data from 2001 to 2007 and demonstrates the rapid change in 
Chinese attitudes about religion during the twenty-first century. Stark and Liu wanted to focus on 
native Chinese religions because while most Western academics are focused on the growth of 
Christianity in China, “millions more [Chinese people] have returned to Buddhism, and once 
again huge numbers of Chinese are pursuing their traditional folk religions and worshipping at 
ancestral shrines” (Stark and Liu 282). Thus, while their comparisons include foreign religions 
like Islam and Christianity, their primary focus is the revitalization of native Chinese religious 
traditions. Their data came from a 2001 national survey by the Research Center for 
Contemporary China at Peking University while the 2007 survey was conducted in 2007 by 
Horizon, Ltd., which is China’s “largest and most respected polling firm” (Stark and Liu 283).  
 
Stark and Liu noticed the drop in respondents who said they had no religious belief from 
93.0% in 2001 to 77.1% in 2007 and believed such a significant change could be explained not 
through a massive number of converts, but, rather a reflection of “an increased willingness of 
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Chinese to admit to having a religion” (Stark and Liu 284) Additionally, they believed that “ it 
seems unlikely that very many of the 77% who said they had no religion were actually 
irreligious,” but instead may have been influenced by the term “religion,” a discussion that will 
take place more deeply in later sections. Furthermore, the number of Buddhists skyrocketed from 
2.1% to 18.1% in a mere six years, which once again  “cannot be a huge wave of conversations 
but a dramatic change in the willingness of Buddhists to come into the open,” which 
demonstrates a noteworthy change in social and political attitudes towards religion in China. 
Overall, they noticed that respondents who reported being involved in some type of religious 
practice increased dramatically from 7.0% in 2001 to 23.9% in 2007. Such significant changes 
demonstrate that there are not necessarily more converts to religion--although this may be the 
case with Christianity--but instead that the social and political climate have made more Chinese 
people comfortable with publicly stating their beliefs in Buddhism or even folk religions. This 
data demonstrates the significant change not only in the number of publicly religious people in 
China, but also the transforming attitude towards religion in the twenty-first century. The desire 
to focus on Chinese youth and specifically to focus on Chinese university students stems from 
this phenomenon that in recent years, more Chinese people are comfortable sharing their 
religious beliefs. Given the drastic change from 2001 to 2007, one would anticipate that the trend 
of openly communicating about religious beliefs would continue, and even more individuals 
would speak candidly about their beliefs. The Chinese youth of today grew up in this more 
accepting and open religious environment, and so I believe they are a critical group to study to 
understand the current perceptions of religion in China. However, before we get into the 
discussion of religion in China today, one must first understand China’s complicated religious 
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history during the mid-twentieth century and how it affected social and political attitudes toward 
Chinese religions.  
 
APPLYING THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF RELIGION TO CHINESE CONTEXT  
When it comes to the most accurate way of collecting data about religious practices in 
China, language has been identified as a major influencer of results. What some scholars have 
discovered is that using the term “religion” while collecting information about Chinese religious 
believers results in very low reported numbers. We have discussed the impact of this word on 
early Chinese scholars’ interpretation of the religious situation in China as well as the negative 
association of religion during the New Culture Movement and The Cultural Revolution; 
however, it is also pertinent to the discussion of data collection and the modern Chinese person’s 
understanding of the meaning of religion. Given these historical and political reasons, it is 
understandable why today’s generation of Chinese people may be uncomfortable expressing 
their religious beliefs because of the stigma associated with the word “religion.” Chau describes 
this as a response to the reality that today religion “is seen as a sensitive term, something 
extremely formal, hierarchical, and political,” which is a product of Chinese religion’s 
tumultuous past (Johnson 28). For outside researchers, this “results in colossal 
misunderstandings when [using] these terms to gauge religious or spiritual life in China” 
(Johnson 28). Many of these surveys use flawed language because they attempt to get Chinese 
people to identify their behavior based on the Western concept of zongjiao (religion). Given the 
historical stigma around the word “religion” and the fact that the concept of religion is imported 
from the West, Johnson claims that if one asks a Chinese person if they believe in zongjiao, 
“almost all Chinese will say no” (Johnson 29). Johnson provides a series of evidence for the 
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claim that using belief in “religion” as a basis for evaluating the religiosity of Chinese people is 
horribly flawed: 
One government survey in 2012, for example, showed that only 10 percent of 
respondents said they had a “religious belief,” with 89.6 percent saying they had none. 
International polling firms seem to reflect similarly low levels of belief. In 2014, for 
example, the Pew Research Center issued a major study on global views about religion. It 
came to the startling conclusion that only 14 percent of respondents believed that 
morality was linked to belief in religion. This led some Western commentators to write of 
“the atheists of Beijing.” In 2015, a WIN/Gallup International Poll went further, reporting 
that 61 percent of Chinese identified themselves as atheists—versus the worldwide 
average of just 11 percent atheists (Johnson 28-9).  
Clearly, use of the term “religion” results in very low numbers of reported religious practitioners. 
However, when asked about specific beliefs, the results completely transform. For example, “In 
a 2007 study of over three thousand people...44 percent agreed with the statement, “life and 
death depends on the will of heaven,” while 25 percent said they had experienced the 
intervention of a “Buddha” (fo) in their lives in the past 12 months. (Johnson 29). Belief in the 
will of heaven and the Buddha is a clear indication of religious belief, but those beliefs were not 
accurately represented in the surveys that merely used the term “religion.” Thus, it is apparent 
that to uncover accurate information about Chinese people’s religious beliefs, one must go 





PREVIOUS DATA COLLECTION  
Another concern regarding collecting accurate information on the number of religious 
practitioners in China is how to label or categorize each religion and their associated practices. 
Some foreign research institutions have attempted to conduct widespread surveys, most notably 
the Pew-Templeton Foundations’ “Global Religious Figures” project. The data collected was as 
follows: 
China’s total population is 1,341,340,000, among whom 18.2% are Buddhists (i.e. 244.12 
million); 5.1% are Christians (i.e. 68.41 million); 21.9% practice folk religions 
(presumably including Daoism since there is no separate category for Daoism) (i.e. 
293.75 million); 1.8% are Muslims (i.e. 24.14 million); 52.2% are unaffiliated (though it 
is not clear if this means “not religious”) (i.e. 700.18 million); and finally, less than 1% 
are Hindus, Jews, and followers of other religions (fewer than 11 million). 
While these provide some clues to the number of religious practitioners in China, depending on 
one’s definition of religion, these categories are somewhat problematic. First, if one considers 
Confucianism as a religion, there is no category for people to articulate what Confucian practices 
they participate in. Second, there is no distinction between Daoism and folk religion. The other 
well-known source of statistics about Chinese religion comes from the Chinese government 
itself. However, it, too, does not paint a full picture of the current religious situation in China. 
The data comes from “China’s Politics and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious 
Belief,” a white paper released in April 2018 by the Information Office of the State Council. 
While it does not give any numbers for Buddhists, Daoists, or those who participate in practices 
associated with folk religion, if one “subtract[s] the number of Muslims and Christians from the 
total number (200 million), we can surmise that the total number of Buddhists, Daoists, and “folk 
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religionists” combined would be around 136 million” (Chau 10). Thus, given that China’s 
population at the time of the survey was approximately 1,400,000,000, “the White Paper 
estimates that the total number of believers to be at 14.29% of the total population, quite low 
when compared to the Pew-Templeton figure of 47%” (Chau 10). Clearly, there are significant 
discrepancies in the number of religious believers in the major surveys that have been conducted 
in China. This dissonance begs the question: how is religion defined in China? How do 
Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and folk religion play into the definition of religion? How 
does the language used in surveys affect their outcome? And finally, is there a difference 
between those who say they have or do not have religious beliefs and the practices those 
individuals participate in?  
 
HISTORY OF DEFINING RELIGION 
 As we have previously discussed, in the academic world the definition of religion has 
been contested by scholars for decades, ranging from a Western context to the Chinese context. 
However, defining religion in China becomes particularly complicated because of its political 
nature. There are major discrepancies between scholarly definitions of religion and the Chinese 
Communist Party’s official stance on religion. Officially, since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has 
made distinctions between religion (zongjiao 宗教) and superstitions (mixin 迷信) (Yang 24-5). 
The CCP sees religion as more institutionalized beliefs and practices, where superstitions are not 
as centrally organized. This gives the government flexibility to ban religious or “superstitious” 
activities associated with cults because “cults” are not official religions. While the government 
has its own interpretation of religion that grants it a certain amount of control over groups that do 
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not fall under its definition, for the purposes of this paper we will be looking at religion through 
an academic lens as opposed to the Chinese government definition.  
 
CHINESE TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS 
 We have seen the importance of language in collecting accurate statistics about the 
number of religious believers in China. This showed that there are more religious believers in 
China than previously thought. To understand the full effect of religion on Chinese culture and 
the Chinese psyche, we must first address the belief systems of traditional Chinese religions. 
Certain elements of Chinese religions have become a major part of Chinese society, which in 
turn has caused many Chinese people to subconsciously hold religious beliefs. Furthermore, to 
understand why many Chinese people do not report that they adhere to one tradition, we must 
analyze the interconnected nature of Chinese religions. By doing so, it will highlight one 
important explanation as to why Chinese people frequently do not claim to be a member of one 
specific religion.  
 
RELIGION IN CHINA IN GENERAL 
China’s religious landscape is unique because it is composed of native and non-native 
religions. Daoism and Confucianism are considered native Chinese traditions, while Buddhism, 
Christianity, and Islam are all imported from other regions. All religious traditions have 
hundreds or even thousands of years of history in China, as Daoism emerged roughly in the 
fourth century C.E., Buddhism was imported as early as the second century CE., Islam was 
brought to China  around the seventh century C.E., and while “Catholicism and Protestantism 
represent distinct affiliations in modern China,” they can both be traced back to Christian 
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missionaries that arrived to China in the seventh century C.E. (Wang et al 1). To visualize the 
religious diversity of China, Fenggang Yang and his team created a map of all recorded religious 
sites in China. Green dots represent mosques, orange dots represent Buddhist temples, red dots 
represent Protestant churches, blue dots represent Daoist temples, and purple dots represent 
Catholic churches. Clearly, religious activity in China is on the rise, which is especially 
interesting in comparison to religious changes in the United States. According to a survey from 
the PEW Research Center, the religious population in the United States has been declining over 
recent decades, while simultaneously “China is trending in the opposite direction; although the 
majority of the Chinese population identifies as non-religious, there are increasing numbers of 
people converting to various world religions” (Wang et al 1).  
 
This changing religious climate in China in recent decades has attracted the attention of 
scholars from around the world. However, as articulated by Stark and Liu, while “the West has 
been focused on the rapid growth of Christianity in China, millions more have returned to 
Buddhism, and once again huge numbers of Chinese are pursuing their traditional folk religions 
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and worshipping at ancestral shrines” (Stark and Liu 282). Much scholarly work focuses 
specifically on the growth of Christianity in China, but oftentimes revitalization of traditions 
associated with Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, and even folk religion are underrepresented 
in the literature. Western scholars may be more interested in Christianity because it is more 
familiar, and it is becoming increasingly popular because the number of converts is easier to 
track. The popularity of Christianity, in that way, is much more tangible than perhaps Buddhism 
or Daoism because those traditions are not built on the need for public commitment or devotion. 
It is much easier to document the number of Christians, but it is a much more difficult task to 
identify who, for example, is a Buddhist because it does not have the same organized structure as 
a Western religion. It is for these reasons that this project intended to focus on not only 
contributing to an underrepresented area of the literature, but also to unearth the religiosity 
within Chinese people.  
 
THREE TRADITIONS 
 Chinese religion is unlike many Western religions because different traditions often 
coexist and have interconnected beliefs. The three main recognized religions are Confucianism, 
Daoism, and Buddhism, also known as the Three Teachings. These three traditions “have the 
markings of organized religion: founders (real or legendary), professional leaders, institutional 
forms, written scriptures, liturgical traditions, etc.” (Jochim 5-6). A survey conducted by 
Fenggang Yang found that “80 to 90 percent of Buddhists and Daoists believe or practice folk 
religion, and 40 to 60 percent of Christians and Muslims also believe or practice folk religion” 
(Yang 29). These findings demonstrate that beliefs from multiple traditions can be held by one 
individual, which means that Chinese religions are more interconnected than they appear to be in 
 29 
the Western world. In other words, “It is not uncommon to find Buddhist and Confucian figures 
in a Daoist temple. Nor is it extraordinary to see a self-professed Buddhist offer incense at a 
Daoist temple to a historical figure known for his Confucian virtues” (Foy). The interconnected 
nature of Chinese traditions is important because it will later help explain why many Chinese 
people are hesitant to identify themselves as a follower of one specific tradition, when in fact 
they hold beliefs stemming from two or more of these traditions. These three traditions are the 
root of a majority of Chinese societal values, and they have contributed to Chinese culture in 
their own ways. While they are separate traditions, they are deeply interconnected, and after 
thousands of years they have persisted. Their continued existence is not limited to self-identified 
practitioners, but their ideologies and practices are the bedrock of Chinese culture. Their 
continued existence shows us not only that religion has persisted not only externally, but 
religious values have continued to be held by many Chinese people subconsciously because they 
were raised in a culture with embedded religiosity.  
 
BUDDHISM IN CHINA 
In order to understand how Chinese traditions could have become interconnected over 
time, it is important to know their basic doctrines, beliefs, and history. When Buddhism was 
imported from India it took on a new identity as it became embedded into the Chinese religious 
framework and became one of the fundamental schools of thought in China. Over hundreds of 
years of development, Chinese Buddhism even developed its own branches native to China, 
including Huayan, Tiantai, Jingtu, and Chan Buddhism (Jones). While Buddhism was originally 
a foreign religion, through its development in China, Buddhists began to “explain the Buddhist 
doctrine in terms of traditional Chinese thought,” so the conflict between Buddhism and Chinese 
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values was alleviated (Zürcher 79). The most significant dissonance between Buddhism and 
Chinese traditional thought was found in the contrasting values of Buddhism and the values of 
Confucianism, especially when it came to Buddhist monasteries. Monastic life “implied the 
abandonment of family life,” which in particular clashed with the Confucian principle of filial 
piety, which taught individuals to take care of their parents and placed high value on family 
(Zürcher 78-9). However, Buddhism eventually developed into its own Chinese attributes, and 
became Chinese Buddhism.  
While China never became a “Buddhist country” like other Asian countries such as 
Korea and Japan, Buddhism still successfully spread throughout the country and became 
embedded in Chinese culture. For example, “the Buddhist concept of salvation could be 
integrated into ancestor worship; the belief in karma and rebirth became part of Chinese popular 
lore” (Zürcher 79). Buddhism eventually had a deeply influential effect on Chinese culture and 
the worldview of many Chinese individuals; consequently, central concepts of Buddhism became 
a backbone of Chinese culture, to the point that, as we will discuss later, many people 
subconsciously hold beliefs that originated from Buddhism. While Buddhism affected the 
worldview of many Chinese people, the ability for Buddhism to combine with traditional 
Chinese beliefs explains its popularity in the country today. In fact, China has the world’s largest 
Buddhist population, with an estimated 185-250 million practitioners, according to Freedom 
House, making it China’s largest institutionalized religion (Albert). While the effect of 
Buddhism is clear based on the number of practitioners, its effect is more deeply rooted into 
Chinese culture, and influences even those who are not technically Buddhist practitioners. 
However, the popularity of Buddhism and its deep influence on Chinese culture would not have 
been possible without the help of Daoism because in order “to help the Chinese comprehend 
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Buddhist concepts, Buddhists borrowed ideas from Daoism via the Chinese language” (Foy). 
Although they are two different traditions, their history of interconnectedness and symbiosis 
highlights the interwoven nature of Chinese traditions. It is important to understand how the 
three major institutions work together because that allows us to comprehend why it is less typical 
to find individuals who identify as a follower or practitioner of a single tradition.  
 
DAOISM IN CHINA  
 Daoism is one of the earliest belief systems in China with thousands of years of history. It 
centers around the concept of 道 (dao or tao), which roughly translates to “the way” or “the path” 
(Peng 250). The Dao is essentially an explanation for all of the functions and changes in the 
observable natural world. The great Chinese philosopher Laozi is credited for writing about the 
Dao in Tao Te Ching, which translates to Classic of the Way and Virtue and is the text from 
which Daoism was born. Laozi is traced back to the 6th century B.C.E., but many scholars today 
question if he truly was a historical figure or is more of a mythological character (Chan). Laozi 
believed that the essence of the Dao could be given a name, but in reality, the Dao is an 
intangible element that cannot be fully expressed in words. Laozi used a metaphor of water to 
help one comprehend the Dao: “Water flows naturally, without interference, and does not attract 
attention. In its weak, unnoticed actions, water (in the same way as the Tao) is able to overcome 
the strong” (Peng 250). In other words, the “Dao cannot be defined or described; it is 
‘nameless’” (Chan). However, for the purposes of attempting to understand it, Laozi gave the 
Dao a name, even though he himself admitted to not knowing its real name.   
There are two words in Chinese used to describe Daoism as a philosophical tradition and 
organized religion, daojia and daojiao, respectively (Chan). While Daoism began as a 
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philosophical tradition started by Laozi, beginning in the Han dynasty from 206BC - 220 A.D., 
Daoism became more institutionalized as it became “distinguished by its own forms of 
organisation, priests, rituals, beliefs, and scripture texts” (Overmyer 5). Daoist gods were 
different from other gods because they were immortal beings and not deified humans. In order to 
connect to these gods, “Daoist priests, trained by masters or in monasteries, developed elaborate 
technologies and rituals devoted to [them],” so over time “Daoism became a complete religious 
system in its own right” (Overmyer 5). Over hundreds of years of development, different schools 
of Daoism were developed, and eventually many basic principles of Daoism became ingrained in 
the Chinese psyche, including the importance of man’s relationship with nature and prioritizing 
one’s physical health. The influence of Daoism on Chinese culture and the Chinese worldview 
will be discussed in more depth;  
 
CONFUCIANISM AS A RELIGION 
For decades, scholars have debated not only the definition of religion, but specifically the 
definition of religion in China. Given the vast range of religious systems and their interconnected 
nature, it can be incredibly difficult to arrive at a definition of Chinese religion that encompasses 
everything from ancestor worship to belief in karma. Defining religion in the Chinese context 
has been problematic for Western scholars because there has been a tendency to apply the 
Western concept of religion onto the Chinese context. As we have previously discussed, the 
concept of “religion” in the West is noticeably different from China; in fact, there was not a word 
for “religion” in Chinese until the term zongjiao “was formed, or rather adopted from Japanese, 
to translate the western concept of ‘religion’ as a structured system of beliefs and practices, 
separate from society, which organizes believers in a church-like organization” (Goossaert 14). 
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The problematic nature of applying “religion” to traditions such as Buddhism, Daoism, 
Confucianism, or folk religion is that, as Adam Chau argues, “readers and scholars often fall into 
a ‘Protestant triumphalist prejudice’ that grants more dignity and legitimacy to religious 
traditions that are believed to be ‘higher’ on an imagined evolutionary trajectory of religions, 
denigrating those that are supposedly less institutionalized, less systemic, more “ritualistic,” 
therefore “primitive” and “lower” (Chau 5). Some definitions of religion can exclude the less 
institutionalized aspects of Chinese religion, which devalues their existence simply because they 
do not fit in the mold of the Western idea of religion. Traditional Chinese religions are far less 
institutionalized than Western religions, where practitioners do not necessarily conform to the 
system of say a Christian church or Muslim mosque. Instead, many individuals who participate 
in religious practices do so often within their family and may never participate in any 
“structured” religion as opposed to their Western counterparts. Thus, the task of defining religion 
in China is difficult. That being said, the most contested tradition is Confucianism as scholars 
have debated its religious or philosophical categorization for decades, so it requires a deeper 
analysis than the other two traditions.  
 
INTRO TO CONFUCIAN BELIEFS  
Like Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism has deeply affected Chinese culture from 
hundreds of years ago to today. Compared to Buddhism and Daoism, Confucianism had a greater 
impact on societal structure; nevertheless, it has also embedded its own values into Chinese 
society, including the veneration of older family members and the importance of education. In 
terms of defining religion, however, Confucianism adds a complicated layer to the definition of 
religion in China. One of China’s most impactful thought systems is Confucianism, which has 
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been critical to China’s social development, from family structures to organization of the 
government. Throughout Chinese history, Confucianism has played a central role in how the 
government operates, which has caused interest of “the cultured elite” to continuously gravitate 
away from Buddhism and back towards Confucianism (Zürcher 79). Since the Han Dynasty (206 
B.C.E.-220 C.E.) Confucianism was the dominant official religion (Zuo 100). Confucius (孔子) 
is arguably China’s most famous philosopher whose ideas have been ingrained in Chinese 
culture and society since the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) when Confucianism was the 
dominant official religion (Zuo 100). Confucius was a government official who saw the 
corruption of the ruling elite and believed that China’s corruption could be solved through the 
“knowledge of antiquity” and learning from the great leaders and thinkers of the past (Jaspers 
53). His values and experiences caused him to “develop a new moral code based on respect, 
honesty, education, kindness and strong family bonds” (“Chinese Culture”). He believed that 
“government is the center of men’s lives and all other considerations derive from it,” so a moral 
and just government was crucial to a harmonious society (Jaspers 57). A moral government 
Confucius imagined began by teaching morality in the family.  His ideology is divided into five 
values: li for ritual etiquette, ren for kindness to fellow humanity, xin for truthfulness and 
sincerity, yi for righteousness, and xiao for filial piety and strong family values (“Chinese 
Culture”). These values, particularly the emphasis on strong family values are still present in 
Chinese society today, demonstrating Confucianism’s lasting impact on Chinese culture. 
In China, Confucianism was applied to a wide variety of aspects of life. For example, 
family structures were based on Confucian doctrines, government officials were selected based 
on their knowledge of Confucian classical texts, and social stability was established through the 
Confucian value of respect for authority. Scholars have long debated whether Confucianism is a 
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philosophy or a religion. However, when Stark and Liu reference scholar Anna Xiao Dong Sun’s 
2005 visit to China, it becomes clear there is a religious element to Confucianism. On her visits 
to temples she “observed many visitors earnestly praying to statues of Confucius for a variety of 
blessings and benefits” (Stark and Liu 284). A great number of Chinese people do have a 
religion or do not believe that Confucianism is a religion, which is reflected by the previously 
mentioned 2007 Horizon Limited survey that found only 12 of 7,021 Chinese in the 2007 survey 
identified Confucianism as their religion (Stark and Liu 284). However, there appears to be a 
discrepancy between the number of individuals who report belief in Confucianism versus those 
who engage in physical acts of prayer or worship. Once again, we see that the definition of what 
constitutes a religion skews the results of many surveys because an individual may not report 
that they believe Confucianism is a religion but may engage in activities directly associated with 
religious practices, specifically those related to Confucius and Confucianism. Furthermore, “the 
Chinese Party-State does not include Confucianism as one of its legally recognized religions” 
and many people “in the general population do not consider Confucianism a religion” although 
“many people do hold certain Confucian values and maintain certain Confucian proprieties” 
(Yang 29). The primary example of this is filial piety, which is a key component of 
Confucianism and is practiced by many Chinese people who do not identify as Confucian 
believers.  
In the article on Chinese Religions in The Encyclopedia of Religion, Jones defines 
religion as “a means of ultimate transformation and/or ultimate orientation” (Jones). She breaks 
down this definition by explaining that “ultimate transformation” implies, 
“(1) a given human condition that is in some way flawed, unsatisfactory, or caught in a 
dilemma; (2) a goal that posits a resolution of that problem or dilemma; and (3) a process 
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leading toward the achievement of the goal. This formula is well-suited to Chinese 
religions because the concept of transformation (hua) is in fact a highly significant 
element in Confucian, Daoist, and Chinese Buddhist thought and practice.”  
While their foundational beliefs are different, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism all believe 
that humanity can be improved through self-cultivation. Although these traditions may not align 
with other definitions of religion, I believe that Jones’ definition applies to religions that have 
uniquely Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, this definition allows us to consider 
Confucianism as a religion. Confucianism’s idea of “ultimate transformation” is “carried out 
through intensive study and discussion, self-examination, and meditation, often in the social 
context of public and private schools and academies, where prayers and sacrificial offerings to 
former Confucian ‘sages and worthies’ accompanied study and discussion” (Jones). Thus, with 
this definition of religion in mind, Confucianism is considered more than just a philosophy, but a 
religious tradition. Defining religion in a way that many scholars have allows for more well-
rounded analysis of Chinese religion, specifically in terms of Confucianism’s effect on Chinese 
culture and society. Clearly, Confucianism has an impact on the value system and practices of 
many Chinese people, so by not including it in the discussion of Chinese religion, we would be 
ignoring many aspects of the human experience that are so critical to Chinese culture.  
 
RELIGIOSITY OF CHINESE YOUTH 
 Now that we more deeply understand the beliefs and practices of traditional Chinese 
religions, we will turn our discussion to the main group of subjects in this study. As we have 
mentioned, Chinese youth are a critical piece of the more general discussion of religion in China. 
The study done by Fenggang Yang and the interviews conducted with DePauw University 
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students both included international students, so in this section we will dive into the history of 
Chinese international students in the United States in general, and at DePauw University more 
specifically. The background and experiences of Chinese students are important to understanding 
the religious environment in which they were raised and why they may have a certain worldview.  
 
HISTORY OF CHINESE STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 As Stark and Liu found, in the early 2000s, they observed that the number of religious 
believers jumped significantly in a very short amount of time. They concluded that this must 
have been because more people felt comfortable expressing their religious beliefs, demonstrating 
that the landscape of China had become more religiously tolerant. Youth have always been at the 
forefront of religious movements, whether they be pro or anti religion. The intent behind 
focusing this project on Chinese university students, including students at DePauw University is 
inspired by the phenomenon that in the past two decades more Chinese people have become 
comfortable sharing their religiosity. One can interpret the significant increase of religious 
reporters to be an indication that the religious climate in China was becoming more tolerant and 
accepting. The Chinese youth of today, including today’s university students, grew up in this 
environment where more and more Chinese people felt comfortable claiming their religious 
identities. Thus, I believe they are a critical group to study and analyze because they are an 
indication of the current religious climate in China. Chinese university students have been in the 
United States and at DePauw University for a very long time, and today they provide an 
important insight into how religion is perceived in China today, and the beliefs held and practices 
done by Chinese people.  
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 Chinese international students have been sent to the United States for over a hundred 
years. The Qing Imperial government that ruled from 1644 to 1911 sent the first group of 120 
students to the United States from 1872 to 1875. The inspiration for this was almost entirely 
political, as the government believed that sending students abroad was “the natural way to face 
the Western challenge,” and were on “a special mission that linked their studies to the cause of 
national salvation.” (Yan and Berliner 174). Almost every member of this early group of Chinese 
students was financially supported by the Chinese government. However, after the Qing dynasty 
was overthrown in 1911, financially independent students from wealthy families increasingly 
studied abroad, in comparison as opposed to the government-backed students who came before 
them. The number of students did not change significantly from then until the late-twentieth 
century. 
From 1949 until the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China was isolated 
from the rest of the world and foreign study was highly restricted. (Yan and Berliner 175). After 
a period of isolation from the rest of the world, China’s policies on international education 
mirrored the economic openness Deng Xiaoping projected. This new time of openness directly 
impacted students’ ability to study and encouraged more students to go to the U.S. for higher 
education. In 1978, the U.S. and China agreed to exchange students and scholars, and the number 
of students coming to the US soared (Yan and Berliner 173). Before this agreement was made, 
there were only 1,000 students from China in 1979, but by 1984 there were 10,100 international 
students from China studying at American colleges. More recently, during the 2018/19 academic 
year, 369,548 international students came from China, which represents 33.7% of all 
international students studying at American universities. Today, students from China represent 
the largest international student group studying in the United States (Yan and Berliner 174). 
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Since China opened to the rest of the world in 1978, it has sent more than three million students 
abroad, and the United States is the most popular destination (Liu 128). Chinese students are a 
massive population of American college students, which make them an important group to study. 
Students from China can be found on college campuses all across the United States and represent 
a significant portion of international students at DePauw.  
 
HISTORY OF CHINESE STUDENTS AT DEPAUW UNIVERSITY  
The pattern of Chinese students studying in the United States also has impacted the 
number of students at DePauw University. The history of Chinese students at DePauw began at 
the turn of the twentieth century. According to Clifton J. Phillips, the first Chinese student at 
DePauw was Ming Chuan Liu who attended the university from 1896 to 1899. His passion for 
Christian ministry brought him to DePauw where he pursued a degree in Sacred Theology at 
DePauw’s School of Theology. Upon graduation, he returned to China and was ordained into the 
Methodist ministry. After Liu’s time at DePauw, the number of Chinese students remained very 
low. Over the next few decades, only one Chinese student graduated from DePauw University. 
Her name was Jean Chin-Ching Hseuh and she graduated in 1913 with a major in chemistry. 
She, too, returned to China after graduation and became the principal of an all girls’ school 
(Phillips 1). The number of students from the late 1800s to the beginning of the 1920s is so few 
that there is detailed information documented about those individual students.  
 However, after the First World War a larger population of Chinese students appeared on 
campus. By fall of 1921, there were four men and one woman who organized a Chinese Students 
Club that held special celebrations on such holidays as the Chinese New Year (Phillips 1). An 
increase of international students at DePauw encouraged students to establish the Cosmopolitan 
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Club in 1922 that sought to encourage closer relations between domestic and international 
students and included several Chinese student members. By 1926, there were 10 Chinese men 
and women in the DePauw student body, which made them the most populous international 
group on campus at that time. Although the future of Chinese students at DePauw seemed 
promising, the number of Chinese students at DePauw declined dramatically over the next few 
years (Phillips 2). In the 1930s and 1940s, relations between the United States and China 
diminished due to an outbreak of civil war in China and later World War II. The disruption was 
so severe that “little is known about the later careers of most of the 40-50 Chinese students who 
studied at DePauw in the preceding decades” (Phillips 2). China was essentially cut off from the 
rest of the world until the 1970s, which directly impacted Chinese students’ ability to study 
abroad. It was not until 1978, almost 100 years after the first students came to the United States, 
that a new influx of Chinese students came to study at American universities.  
After a decades-long hiatus, Chinese return to DePauw in 1986, with only one student 
enrolling during that year. This trend continued for many years, and as demonstrated by the 
graph, there was only a handful of Chinese students at DePauw between 1986 and 2006.  
 
Significant changes in the number of international students from China occurred between 
2007 and 2008, where the number of incoming students jumped from nine in 2007 to 26 in 2008. 
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According to DePauw, 2008 was a record not only for the number of students from China, but 
for international students as a whole. During this year, students from China were the greatest 
international population, followed by India and Vietnam. International students comprised 12% 
of the incoming class, a proportion that has fluctuated between 2008 and 2016, with a steady 
increase from 2016 to 2019. In 2016, 14% of the incoming class were international students, 
followed by 15% in 2017, 17% in 2018, and culminating in the highest proportion of 
international students in DePauw history in 2019 with 18.7% of the incoming class coming from 
countries outside of the United States. The number of students from China has also fluctuated, 
with a significant drop between 2018 and 2019, from 43 incoming students to only 15. However, 
this number only represents the number of incoming students, so the proportion of Chinese 
students on campus is still significant.  
 
CHINESE STUDENT RELIGIOSITY  
 As more Chinese students have attended American universities, they have become a 
group that scholars are interested in studying. DePauw Chinese students are a part of this ever-
growing population that have experiences and worldviews scholars want to understand and 
analyze. In fact, in the past few decades, scholars have started focusing more on the religiosity of 
young Chinese people and specifically Chinese university students. Yang describes these surveys 
and their findings: 
“According to one article (Zuo 2006), a 1998 survey found that 13.4 percent of college 
students in Beijing were religious believers; a 2000 survey found that 11.8 percent of 
college students in Shanghai were religious believers. The latest survey of college 
students in Shanghai (Huang et al 2009) finds that about 19 percent of the college 
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students admitted to belief in religion, among them, 4.9 percent were Protestant Christian, 
0.6 percent Catholic, 0.8 percent Muslim, 4.6 percent Buddhist, 0.8 percent Daoist, and 
7.3 percent believing some kind of folk religious gods. The survey also reports that 
among those students without a religious identity, 67.5 percent expressed interest in 
religion, especially in Christianity and Buddhism, and only 10 percent of them said that 
they would never become religious believers. It also says that the proportion of Christians 
among college students is bigger than that of the general population and the majority of 
them converted after entering college” (Yang, Youth and Religion, 157).  
These surveys were conducted in China and clearly found that although the percentage of 
religious believers was somewhat low and fell below 20%, it is clear that at least some Chinese 
college students were religious, and the number of youth who are believers is substantial. 
Additionally, it demonstrates that over two-thirds of the participants in the Huang et al survey 
expressed interest in religion. This shows that although they might not be religious, this 
generation has a more open-minded attitude toward religion and is curious to learn what they 
might not have been taught at home or in school.  
 
INTERVIEW INSPIRATION AND FINDINGS 
 Chinese university students are an underrepresented population in the discussion of 
religion. However, as we have seen, they are an important group to analyze because they hold 
different attitudes than older generations. Thus, their perspective can add important findings to 
the larger conversation about Chinese religion. In the following section, we will discuss in 
greater depth Fenggang Yang’s surveys at Purdue, which made significant contributions to the 
literature and greatly influenced this thesis. Furthermore, we will compare my interview findings 
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to the existing literature. I will argue that the interview findings strongly support a variety of 
conclusions from other scholars.    
 
SURVEY OF CHINESE STUDENTS AT PURDUE  
In addition to surveys about Chinese students in China, more surveys have been 
conducted about Chinese international students studying in the United States However, while 
many scholars have studied Chinese international students in the United States, “scholars have 
paid little attention to students’ experience of religion” (Liu 124). Academic work done about 
Chinese international students had historically not discussed their religious identity or how they 
experience religion while studying in the United States. Furthermore, most surveys about 
Chinese religiosity focus on a wide range of Chinese people, and do not focus solely on the 
experience of Chinese international students who represent a younger generation who have more 
access to religious outlets. However, one specialist began focusing on Chinese international 
students studying in the United States. This study is worth investigating deeply because it is the 
most comprehensive collection of data about Chinese university student religiosity. As was 
previously mentioned, the studies conducted at Purdue served as an inspiration for this study, so 
a thorough analysis will aid in understanding it was so influential.  
In 2016 and 2018, Fenggang Yang engaged in research projects that surveyed the 
Chinese students at Purdue University, where he is a professor of sociology and the founder of 
The Center on Religion and Chinese Society. Yang acknowledges the limitations of past research 
on Chinese religiosity when he states, “they tend to follow the conventional survey design of 
choosing only one religion among several given options. However, forcing respondents to 
choose a single religious identity may fail to capture people’s religious life in modern society” 
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(Yang 23). Thus, his research still makes clear distinctions between Confucianism, Daoism, 
Buddhism, and folk religion as he asks participants about their “religious practices rather than 
about beliefs in abstract categories” (Palmer 19). In a study conducted in 2010, he asked 
questions such as “Do you worship in temples on the Chinese New Year,?” “Do you believe in 
ghosts,?” and “Do you burn incense to deities,?” as opposed to more general questions such as 
“What religion do you believe in?” By asking a new set of questions, he and his team discovered, 
“only about 15% of Chinese are strict atheists, while 85% of them do have some type of belief in 
supernatural entities,” once again demonstrating that there is a religious element to the lives of 
many Chinese people, even if they do not associate as religious (Palmer 19). His use of a new 
strategy of asking questions was a breakthrough in finding much more accurate information 
about Chinese religiosity.  
He continued to conduct research using this methodology in the aforementioned studies 
from 2016 and 2018, which focused on Chinese students at Purdue. His study of Chinese 
religiosity was a comparison of student perspectives before and after arriving in the United States 
where he documented changes in belief in Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Islam, and folk religion. The survey also accounted for varied levels of belief, ranging from 
“Completely believe” to “Do not believe at all.” In addition to overall beliefs, he asked about 
more specific practices associated with the major religions previously mentioned. He also asked 
students about their participation in “ancestor worship,” “Buddhist activities,” “Confucian 
activities,” “Daoist activities,” etc. Additionally, the survey also asked students what proportion 
of their peers know about their religious beliefs. Finally, Yang asked students about specific 
religious beliefs, including belief in elements such as karma, reincarnation, heaven, and hell.  
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His survey and the emphasis on asking about specific activities was inspiration for this 
study. The intention behind this study was to compare how students religiously self-identified 
versus the beliefs they held or practices they participated in. Thus, the interviews conducted in 
this study asked students about their beliefs and practices to determine if there are discrepancies 
between what a student believes in and what religious practices they actually participate in. My 
interview questions were inspired by an interest in collecting more information about how 
students religiously self-identify in comparison to if they agreed to have a belief in a religious 
element, such as karma. Some questions were also targeted at gathering young people’s attitudes 
toward discussing religion with peers, their attitude toward those who do hold religious beliefs, 
and how education about religion is approached in the classroom. Finally, while it was not the 
focus of the study, students were asked about their attitude toward Christianity as it is rapidly 
growing in popularity in China. The intent of the interviews was to collect deeper information 
about the Chinese youth psyche that cannot be accounted for in surveys that only gather 
statistics. Rather, the interviews allow for a better understanding of what Chinese students think 




 Students were asked if they had a religious belief and their reasons for having or not 
having one. The intent of asking this question was to determine if student responses aligned with 
previous findings that discovered most students, when asked if they are religion, will say no; 
however, when asked questions about specific beliefs or practices, typically many individuals 
will report they do hold some beliefs associated with religion. All of the students responded 
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saying they did not have a religious belief. This supports the previously mentioned findings 
reported by Yang, who found that less than 20% of students reported they had a religious belief 
(Yang, Youth and Religion). Interviewee responses supported the often-low response rate of 
religious self-identification. Furthermore, holding beliefs in religious elements like karma was 
typical of interviewees, which support the findings of Yang’s Purdue study. There, he discovered 
that although students claimed to not be a religious believer, 35.9% of respondents believed in 
karma. Overall, while the interviews were more of a qualitative study, the responses of students 
aligned with many scholars’ findings that Chinese youth identify as not having a religion yet 
believe in religious elements.  
 
Another set of questions investigated what students remember learning about religion 
growing up. This was intended to shed light on the difference studies have found between the 
government’s stance toward religion and the academic stance toward teaching it in the 
classroom. While the Chinese government is not completely tolerant of religion, the situation in 
many Chinese classrooms is more tolerant. In January 1992, “in his ‘problems related to 
religious activities,’ then Prime Minister Li Peng… [expressed the] separation of religion and 
education” (Nanbu 226). Although there is a separation of religion and schooling, religion is still 
taught, but typically under the subjects of history or geography. Interestingly, the textbook 
Inhabitants of the World states, “In China, the majority of ethnic Han people do not believe in 
religion” (Nanbu 229). So, while Chinese students are learning about religion, they are 
subconsciously being reminded that most Chinese people are not religious, which in turn could 
affect the way they perceive their own religious identity and the identity of others. I asked 
students if they remember being taught about religion in school. It appears as though Nanbu’s 
analysis of religion in China being taught more as a subject of history than a discussion about 
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personal beliefs is corroborated by student interviews. Interviewee 1 stated that religion was 
taught in history and geography class where students were taught about how the different 
religious groups are typically associated with certain regions. Her memory of learning about 
religion in the context of history reaffirms Nanbu’s analysis of junior high textbooks. Other 
interviewees similarly mentioned learning about religion in the context of Chinese history. 
Nanbu states that, “in Chinese education, although religious education understood as imparting 
the values of a particular religion does not take place, religious education defined broadly as 
acquiring knowledge of religions does occur” (Nanbu 233). Students are not necessarily taught 
the specific beliefs of each tradition, but their origins, typical regions in which they are popular, 
and the number of believers worldwide. It does appear that schools are still teaching students to 
believe in science and Marxism instead of religion, which aligns with China’s official socialist 
political stance and the belief that “religion is supposed to wither away as socialism is 
established” (Overmyer 1). Nanbu’s findings about the context in which religion is taught in 
China was supported by what interviewees remember being taught in school, demonstrating that 
religion is not an unspoken topic, but nevertheless is taught on a surface level that does not teach 
or promote value systems associated with each religion.  
Thus, while government policies are stricter than educational policies in many situations, 
the classroom seems to be a more religiously tolerant place. In recent decades, as more and more 
Chinese people turned or returned to religion, Chinese society’s outlook on religion has 
transformed from denial and suppression to a more tolerant and accepting attitude. Learning 
about the world’s religions in the classroom may have impacted the students’ responses as many 
students reported that they did not have their own religious belief, but the common trend was that 
they viewed religion positively and were respectful toward religious believers. In fact, studies 
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have been conducted about the connection between education level, age, and tendency to be 
religious or tolerate religion. One particularly relevant study was conducted by Jeremy E. 
Uecker, where he focused on education and religion in China because he believed it to be an 
understudied area. One explanation he has for a low rate of religious belief in young Chinese 
students is that they may be too focused on the college entrance exam, which is incredibly 
demanding and time consuming. Students may be so focused on preparing that they have no time 
to develop their personal beliefs. Additionally, in school, students are still taught “Marxism and 
atheism, which may undermine students’ personal religious commitment and shape their 
attitudes toward religion more generally” (Ueker 159). This may be the case for students in 
primary and secondary school, but the relationship with level of education and religiosity 
becomes more complicated as students get older and encounter more forms of education.  
Students who study abroad are often exposed to a religiously diverse context, which in 
turn increases their familiarity with religion. Ueker claims that students who are put in more 
religiously diverse environments are provided “the opportunity for... more tolerant religious 
attitudes to develop” (Ueker 163). One interviewee stated that since coming to the United States 
for high school her attitude changed quite a lot. She stated, “I do look at it from a different 
perspective because I formed this positive image of people who are religious. After getting to 
DePauw I learned a lot about not judging people based on their experience or what they believe 
in. I think it’s great to keep my mind open, so a person who is religious or not, it doesn’t really 
matter to me.” The opportunity for this student to study abroad and be immersed in a religiously 
diverse context caused her attitude towards religion to change to become more tolerant, which 
appears to affirm Ueker’s assertion.  
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In addition to the Chinese education system’s influence on religiosity, Liu Jinguang 
provides a historical and social analysis of why Chinese people may not hold their own beliefs 
but are tolerant of others. She believes that traditional Chinese culture shaped religions--both 
native and non-native--and that the tolerant beliefs of the religions also shaped the culture. She 
references the tolerant nature of all of the religious traditions, even though they have different 
interpretations of peace and tolerance. For example, Buddhism believes in nonviolence and non-
killing of all living things because all living things are equal, which in turn implies that there 
should be “peaceful coexistence between societies, nations, and people” (Liu 206). Additionally, 
Taoism believes in the relationship between humans and nature, and calls for human beings to 
adopt the laws of nature and live peacefully with their surroundings. Consequently, Taoists and 
ideas from Taoism result in a tolerant and peaceful worldview. Even Christianity, an imported 
religion, has caused Chinese Christians to call for “harmony with [heaven], harmony with the 
people, harmony with the society” (Liu 206). Overall, all of the major religions in China support 
peace and tolerance, which has caused Chinese society to also emphasize tolerance. While an 
individual may specifically be a Buddhist or Taoist or a follower of any of these traditions, the 
tolerant worldview they all hold -- in their own ways -- has become embedded in the culture, and 
therefore affects the mindset of a significant number of Chinese people. Thus, many Chinese 
people have this same tolerant worldview, which is certainly one aspect of understanding why so 
many young Chinese people accept and respect the beliefs of religious people.  
 A significant amount of the literature acknowledges the divide between religious practice 
and belief. A very clear example of the disconnect between practices, beliefs, and self-identity 
was when Interviewee 2 told me about her grandma. She stated, “My grandma she kind of 
believes in Buddhism and she does all of the religious practices…but I’m not sure if that’s a 
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believer.” In other words, she does all of the things a religious practitioner would and genuinely 
believes in the doctrines but would not call herself a Buddhist. However, the student said “that’s 
very normal in China. I think everyone [is] influenced by these religions very deeply.” This 
seemingly contradictory understanding of religion supports much of the existing literature, but it 
certainly begs the question why her grandmother and many others (including the interviewee) 
participate in religious practices and have religious beliefs, but do not say they are believers.  
 
EXPLANATION FOR STUDENT REACTIONS 
 In this final section, I will provide a series of analyses that explain why students say they 
are not religious believers but hold religious beliefs or have participated in religious practices. 
First, we will return to the discussion of the word “religion” and how scholars were influenced 
by Western modernization, which caused them to conclude that religion was a negative thing in 
society. Next, I will address multiple psychological approaches to understand how religious 
elements in society have impacted the Chinese worldview. Finally, we will revisit the 
conversation of the interconnected nature of Chinese religions as an explanation for why Chinese 
people may not identify as a follower of only one tradition. These explanations help us 
understand why the literature and the conducted surveys have found an internalized religiosity 
amongst respondents.  
 
EARLY CHINESE SCHOLAR HOPES FOR SECULARIZATION 
 Returning to the conversation of early Chinese scholars, one of the major reasons why 
scholars shunned religion was in an attempt to follow the Western belief that modernization 
required secularization. The same group of scholars from the early twentieth century that shared 
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their opinions that China lacked religion was also influenced by outside factors. In addition to 
discrepancies over the use of the term “religion”, “many intellectuals became enthralled with the 
rationalism of the European Enlightenment. Consequently, the study of religion by Chinese 
scholars was profoundly shaped by this Western ‘scientific’ perspective” (Lizhu 92). As a result, 
scholars adamantly rejected the existence of religion in Chinese culture to demonstrate that 
China was modern and therefore secular. For example, the philosopher Qian Mu wrote about 
Buddhism, but claimed that Buddhism was, in fact, not a religion in the typical understanding of 
the word. He stated, “the spirit of Buddhism is similar to that of Chinese culture. Although it 
may be called a religion, its object of faith is an internal Buddha or Bodhisattva, rather than an 
external God...Therefore, Buddhist belief seems to begin and end with human beings. We might 
say that Buddhism is a religion based in humanity” (Lizhu 93). He attempted to remove the 
religious elements of Buddhism by rejecting the external spiritual nature of the Buddha. He 
simultaneously focused on the human elements of Buddhism, which minimizes the spiritual 
aspects of Buddhism. Qian Mu is just one example of this early generation of scholars who, 
“under the influence of Western culture, believed that China’s lack of religiousness might well 
be an advantage in an era of secularization and modernization” (Lizhu 92). The writings of this 
group of Chinese scholars claim that Chinese ideologies are not actually related to religion, all of 
which was an attempt to follow the lead of the West. In order to truly modernize, these scholars 
believed that religion should be eradicated from society in order to make true progress. Although 
these scholars made their impact on society a century ago, their influence was the catalyst for 
many anti-religious movements, which have all affected the religious situation in China today 
and the mindset many Chinese people hold. Anti-religious sentiments from decades are still 
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embedded into Chinese culture and politics today, and surely have affected the mindset of many 
young Chinese that are raised with these cultural attitudes toward religion.  
 
“PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFICIT” 
 In addition to a historical and political background of why students may be inclined to 
state they are not religious, there are also psychological explanations. One scholar, X. M. Zhang, 
used the term “psychological deficit” to explain typical responses of Chinese university students 
when they are asked about their religious beliefs. He claimed that this “psychological deficit” 
included a combination of features of contemporary Chinese college students, which he listed as 
follows:  
1) randomness of belief; when they choose religions, they focus on form rather than 
essence, outward appearance rather than inner meaning, lacking directionality, 2) 
utilitarianism of belief; they usually ask for religious support for practical problems, such 
as entering a higher school, emotional frustration, and suffering pain, 3) religious 
motivation of helplessness; they may subconsciously send a signal to God for help in the 
case of despair, hoping God can help them out of trouble, 4) pluralism of religious 
beliefs; driven by the mindset of “trying everything,” they are interested in all kinds of 
religions, but they seldom focus their interests on a certain religion (Chen 644-45)  
This “psychological deficit” is a term used in the sphere of psychology, but in this case was 
applied to Chinese student religiosity specifically. The features he identified were found in many 
students’ responses. For example, students referenced that it was typical for Chinese people to 
lean on religious support when they were wishing for something such as good grades. 
Interviewee 2 specifically referenced going to a Buddhist temple to pray for future academic 
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success and to use Zhang’s language “practical problems.” She stated, “I [just] hope my family 
will be healthy ...and [my parents’ work goes well] ...When I was applying to colleges here, that 
year around April or March I went to a temple that is famous for…读书 (studies). I went to that 
temple with my family and prayed, like, hope I can get into a good school and get good grades.” 
This example directly supports Zhang’s second proposal “utilitarianism of belief” claiming that 
students may turn to religion and prayer when hoping for something more practical. 
Furthermore, students seemed interested in learning more about religion, but did not have a 
specific religion they wanted to learn more about. Rather, it was a general interest in religion or 
finding multiple traditions appealing. In my surveys, I found more evidence to back up Zhang’s 
claims that Chinese college students have a utilitarianism of belief and a pluralism of religious 
beliefs.  
 
RELIGIOUS IDEAS IN POPULAR MENTALITY 
Overmyer describes how religious elements particularly from Buddhism have become 
ingrained into the Chinese psyche, stating that “ideas of karma and rebirth have influenced 
Chinese literature and popular mentality” (Overmyer 5). Religious elements of various traditions 
have become so embedded in the Chinese culture that they are subconsciously “believed” by a 
majority of Chinese people. For example, the idea of karma is a religious element from 
Buddhism that many Chinese people believe in, although they do not identity as Buddhist. This 
originally religious concept has become integrated into Chinese culture. Although rooted in a 
religious tradition, it has transformed into a moral code as Chinese people use this concept of 
“what goes around comes around” as motivation for living a morally good life. While many are 
not motivated to go moral things because of a religious calling, the ethical guidelines many 
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follow in fact stem from core beliefs of religious traditions. Thus, many Chinese people do not 
believe in religion, but religious elements are subconsciously impacting the worldview of some 
Chinese people. It is not appropriate to label these people as “religious” considering they do not 
identify as religious; however, they are impacted by a set of morals that is deeply impacted by 
religious concepts such as karma. This concept was further explained by Chen who “proposed 
that the views of heaven and destiny and the worship of spirits and gods were the main 
psychological features of religion among the common people…[which was] the result of a 
combination of the ideas of the three religions,” Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism” (Chen 
644). While a majority of people do not join formal religions, he claims that “an eclectic Chinese 
traditional culture made up of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, as well as witchcraft and 
superstition, has developed” (Chen 44). Thus, the traditional Chinese culture has become a 
significant influence on the modern Chinese secular or irreligious mindset.   
As previously mentioned in the research findings section, one student seemed quite aware 
that Chinese society has religion naturally ingrained in the culture; she stated that “in my family, 
we won’t say [we are] a Buddhism believer…but a lot of people do the religious practice 
subconsciously. It’s already in [our] blood” (Interviewee 2). It appears that some young Chinese 
are even aware of this internalized sense of religion and have an understanding of how growing 
up in this culture has impacted their morality and decision making. Religious elements that have 
been ingrained into Chinese culture provide a strong explanation as to why individuals believe in 
religious elements but do not believe in the religious tradition those elements come from. In this 
case, the interviewee was primarily referring to elements of Buddhism, but the same is true for 
Confucianism and Daoism. Chinese people who adhere to Confucian values are not engaging in 
morally good behavior because they are religiously inspired to do so, but rather, elements of 
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Confucianism are ingrained into Chinese society. This causes people who grow up in that society 
to subconsciously follow these moral guidelines simply because they are a part of the culture. So, 
while an individual may not identify as a Confucian or a follower of any other religious tradition, 
they may hold beliefs that align with a religion. The following section will discuss in greater 
depth the integration of Daoism into the Chinese psyche and how it, too, has become an 
internalized religion.  
 
“TAO OF CHINESE THOUGHT” 
 It was previously discussed that Daoism has had a significant impact on Chinese society, 
but psychologists have made a much more specific connection between Daoism and the way 
Chinese people see the world, and in this case see religion. This phenomenon is referred to as the 
“Tao of Chinese thought” or “naive dialecticism,” which was originally coined by cultural 
psychologist Kaiping Peng. He explains that Daoism has become ingrained into Chinese society 
and has therefore made a deep impact on the Chinese psyche. He concludes that the Western 
thought process and the Chinese thought process are very different, which when applied to the 
case of religion can help us understand the apparent contradiction between not identifying as 
religious but believing in religious elements or participating in religious practices. For example, 
in a study Peng found that “the Chinese not only used more concrete self-descriptions, but more 
changeable, contradictory, and holistic statements when describing the self” (Peng 255). These 
findings and the findings of my study can be explained by the integration of Daoist principles in 
the minds of many Chinese people. What Peng describes as the “principle of change” refers to 
the Daoist belief that reality is in constant flux and does not stand still. The “principle of change 
is the logical foundation of naive dialecticism: The notion of change leads to a belief in 
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contradiction, and contradiction comes as a result of a belief in change (if all phenomena in the 
universe are constantly changing, then what is true today may not be true tomorrow). Holism, in 
turn, is the consequence of a belief in change and contradiction” (Peng 255). The mindset of 
many Chinese people is impacted by Daoist thoughts, which helps explain why students 
responded in ways that appear contradictory, primarily that students stated they were not 
religious believers but believed in religious elements. To a Western audience, these responses 
seem incompatible, but the Chinese psyche does not see a contradiction between these two 
statements. Peng states, “The key difference is that the Chinese naïve dialecticism denies the 
reality of true contradiction, and never sees those contractions as logically opposite” because 
they accept the unity of opposites (Peng 256). Once again, this idea of opposites working 
together comes from Daoism and the belief that life is complex and full of contradiction.  
Overall, the reason for the difference in thinking can be contributed to vastly different 
folk epistemologies, which have impacted both groups for hundreds if not thousands of years. 
Chinese folk epistemology is strongly impacted by Daoist thoughts. In fact, Peng references a 
study analyzing Chinese proverbs that found that “close to 20% were found to be Taoist in 
nature” (Peng 252). While Confucianism may have impacted social life and the way that 
families, society, and the government became organized, Daoism had a greater impact on 
Chinese mentality and worldview. After all, as Chinese philosopher Hsu Dao-jing stated, “‘The 
Tao has become the core of Chinese cultures, the beliefs of Chinese people and the foundation of 
Chinese societies’” (Peng 249). The Tao of Chinese thought is not a discussion of whether the 
American or Chinese way of seeing things is better, but simply a psychological explanation for 
why students may have answered the way they did.  
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Peng articulates the importance that one worldview is not superior to the other by 
referring back to the traditional symbol of Daoism: yin and yang. This symbol alone helps us 
understand how Daoism has affected the Chinese psyche. He states, “The wave shapes reflect 
continual movement, which [represents] the principle of change. The principle of contradiction is 
represented by the fact that there is a white spot inside the black shape, and a black spot inside 
the white shape…” The principle of holism is apparent because this symbol can only be 
appreciated holistically as one sees how the yin and yang work together (Peng 259). He goes one 
step further to claim that the American way is more like yang due to its forceful and linear 
approach while the Chinese way is more like yin because it is more tolerant and flexible. Thus, 
he concludes that, “the ideal state or ultimate strength of human thinking should be a 
combination of both yin and yang, a synthesis of many different ways of thinking” (Peng 259). 
The Tao of Chinese thought is an important psychological addition to the discussion of why 
Chinese students hold certain attitudes toward religion.  
 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 
Another element that provides an explanation for the rarity of a Chinese person 
exclusively identifying as a member of a religious group circles back to the interconnected nature 
of Chinese religious traditions. In their hundreds or thousands of years of history, neither  
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“[Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, or the state religion] emphasized total conversion or 
an exclusive affiliation. These formations did not exist as congregations or churches; 
instead, they served the state and the people by providing ritual services, healing services, 
and moral education. Though people may have developed certain affiliations with some 
of these institutions, most would not identify themselves exclusively with anyone of 
them. An exclusive religious identity is foreign to a Chinese culture. Thus, to the extent 
that to “‘be religious’” is understood in modern times as involving an exclusive religious 
identity, most Chinese would not see themselves as being religious.” (Palmer 29) 
An individual could believe in different aspects of these traditions or participate in activities 
related to multiple, all while not being forced to conform to merely one tradition. Therefore, 
when asked if they are religious, Chinese people are most likely not thinking about identifying as 
a member of a certain religious group, but rather they consider themselves irreligious because the 
beliefs they hold may not be categorized by one tradition.  
Decades of scholars dismissing the existence of religion in China in combination with the 
lack of religion being seen in daily life has influenced the Chinese understanding of religion 
within their country and culture. Palmer eloquently summarizes this phenomenon when he states, 
“Religion is not something that is obviously visible; therefore, the Chinese connect their personal 
experience with the discourse on the absence of religion in China; and they employ this mixture 
of intellectual discourse and personal experience to interpret what the know of Chinese history 
and philosophy – an interpretation that tends to erase, obscure, or ignore their religious 
dimensions” (Palmer 19). From the first misuse of the term “religion,” to the May Fourth 
Movement that engrained the unimportance of religion into the Chinese psyche to the destruction 
of religion during the Cultural Revolution and the stigma associated with “religion,” many 
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elements have contributed to the fact that a majority of Chinese people do not consider 
themselves religious, yet engage in religious practices or hold religious beliefs. Nevertheless, 
these religious elements do exist, and DePauw students themselves have participated in religious 
activities and hold beliefs that I have argued correspond with traditional Chinese religions. 
 
RISE OF CHRISTIANITY 
 While the main focus of this project was to investigate traditional Chinese religions, 
discussing the growing popularity of Christianity is inevitable. Although Christianity has been in 
China for centuries, the real growth has not been until the last few decades. In fact, Fenggang 
Yang writing for The Association of Religion Data Archives states that from “1950 to 2010, the 
number of Christians in China increased from 4 million to 67 million” and 10 years from now, 
China is projected to have some 225 million Protestant Christians alone, a figure similar to the 
entire Christian population today in the United States” (Yang, ARDA). Many scholars have 
predicted that we will soon see more Christians in China than in the United States. Religion in 
general has re-flourished in China, yet it is Christianity that has proven to be the fastest growing 
faith. One interviewee was especially perplexed by the incredibly fast spread of Christianity in 
China. She told me that her grandma had recently converted to Christianity and said she was 
“shocked” to learn this information. Additionally, she brought up the increasing popularity of 
Christianity throughout the country and was very surprised that a foreign religion had gained so 
much traction in a country with an abundance of religious history. She stated, “I don’t know how 
I feel about it. It’s kind of awkward and weird. China, this land, has been Confucian, Daoist, and 
even Buddhist for thousands of years. And then suddenly Christianity came [to China] and it 
[just exploded].”  
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However, Yang provides a more historical explanation for why this trend may not be so 
surprising after all. He states that for many Chinese, “Christianity is associated with a modern 
society and modern values such as freedom and democracy” (Yang, ARDA). The association 
with modernity and growth is an explanation for why Christianity is becoming so widespread. 
On a more historical level, Yang believes that Christianity was able to gain a foothold based on 
the gap that was left from communal and rural life during the Cultural Revolution. In other 
words, many Chinese people were left with a sense of “alienation,” and began searching for “a 
coherent system of meaning that was once supplied by communism,” (Yang, ARDA). 
Christianity provided Chinese the opportunity to fill not only a religious gap, but also the social 
gap as the Christian congregation provides a community and support system. In contrast, 
Buddhism is more rooted in the individual experience as opposed to a communal experience, so 
perhaps that is why more Chinese have been drawn to Christianity over Buddhism. This analysis 
of the appeal of Christianity seems to apply particularly to older generations that sought to fill a 
void left by the Cultural Revolution (e.g. Yang’s father converted to Christianity on his 
deathbed, so he has a personal connection to this religious growth). The turn to Christianity 
appeared to be true primarily for the interviewees’ elderly family members, as multiple people 
referenced grandparents who had converted. However, Interviewee 5 also mentioned that one of 
her closest friends from home was Christian, so it is true also for some younger people; yet, she 
also stated that she believed her friend was “definitely in the minority,” so Christianity may not 
be as popular among Chinese youth. Overall, although Christianity is not as embedded into 
Chinese culture as other religions, Yang’s explanation for its growth makes it not quite as 
“shocking.”  
 61 
Many of my questions for students were about these traditional religions and practices 
and beliefs associated with them; however, some students voluntarily brought up Christianity as 
they had interacted with the religion itself or knew people in their lives who had converted to 
Christianity. Bringing up Christianity while discussing religion in general demonstrates that 
Christianity is an important element to their understanding of religion in China. Furthermore, 
these conversations showed that there is still a strong association between the term “religion,” 
and the traditional view that religion should be structured like Christianity.  
 
COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
 As was previously mentioned, Fenggang Yang’s study at Purdue was a very impactful 
contribution to the study of Chinese international student religiosity. His approach to the studies 
was discussed as well as his findings about the discrepancy between religious identity and 
practice. However, his specific findings have yet to be analyzed and compared to the findings of 
the conducted interviews. While the statistics he found cannot necessarily be compared to a 




He found that “Before coming to the US, most respondents at least occasionally 
participated in ancestor worship (78%)” (Yang, 2018 Purdue Survey). Experience with ancestor 
worship was also common among interviewees, and multiple students reported praying to their 
ancestors on Chinese holidays. Yang found that after coming to the United States participation in 
ancestor worship and Buddhism dropped significantly, from 78% to 6% and from 36% to 5%, 
respectively (Yang, 2018 Purdue Survey). He also found declines in participation in Confucian 
and Daoist activities after coming to the United States. While my interviews did not track 
changes in frequency of religious practices, I did ask if students felt as though their attitude 
toward religion had changed since coming to the United States. None of the interviewees had 
converted to a new religion nor had they picked up new religious practices, but some had 
experience with Christianity. In some cases, students had become introduced to Christianity 
through host families or other Americans they had met. For example, Interviewee 7 stated that 
she went to a religious high school in the United States and went to church every week with her 
host family where they prayed together if something was wrong in the country or if family 
members were sick. Additionally, she attended chapel and would pray before final exams with 
her peers. However, even though she had been exposed to Christianity for years, she still stated 
that she “might be halfway into Christianity” because she did not agree with certain Christian 
beliefs about abortion or homosexuality. Instead, she agreed more with the idea of love thy 
neighbor, and even showed interest in learning more about the Bible. The interviewees did not 
report a change in their religious beliefs but mentioned more frequent interactions with religion 
or religious people.  
 The interviews also found that in some cases, the Marxist emphasis on pursuing science 
because religion is superstitious is still an ideology that is present in society and is therefore 
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affecting the opinions of some Chinese youth. For example, Interviewee 5 stated that back home 
in China “generally people consider religion as something that is not smart” because many 
believe that “science is opposite to religion.” However, this is not necessarily universal because 
she referenced a science teacher from high school who taught them that many of the top 
scientists turn to religion at some point in their lives. While the impact of Marxist anti-religion is 
still present, and the interviewee believes that it is a commonly held view in China, there still 
may be a group that think the two can co-exist. She also re-emphasized the concept that while 
many Chinese people may not believe in religion, they also will not speak out against it, which 
indicates a more tolerant attitude held by Chinese people regarding others’ religiosity.  
 
LIMITATIONS  
 There are limits to this study because of the number of interviews and the selected group 
of interviewees. This selected group does not reflect the attitudes of all Chinese students at 
DePauw or all Chinese students at other universities, whether in the United States, China, or 
anywhere else. However, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing a more in-
depth understanding of what some Chinese youth believe about religion. These findings are 
important because they demonstrate the disconnect between self-identity and specific beliefs, 
which is supported by the existing literature. This study also explored potential explanations for 
why students hold certain beliefs and how growing up in China has impacted their worldview. It 
is not a criticism of China, but rather an attempt to understand how China’s complicated 





 This project analyzed the historical, political, and academic background that led to the 
common understanding that China is a country without religion. Chinese scholars’ comparison of 
Western religion to native Chinese religions caused them to assume that China had no religion. 
Furthermore, the desire for modernity and secularization led to two major anti-religious 
movements, The New Culture Movement and the Cultural Revolution. Decades of anti-religious 
rhetoric and policies made religion a politically sensitive topic, which caused many Chinese 
people either to hesitant admitting they are religious or to denounce religion altogether. 
However, the myth that China is a country full of irreligious people soon unraveled as more 
studies and surveys began to collect data about Chinese religiosity. At first, Western scholars 
found data that supported the original myth that China is a country without religion, but once 
scholars began to use the appropriate language, the data completely changed. Additionally, 
survey responses changed so drastically that Stark and Liu found that it was not possible for so 
many people to convert in such a short amount of time; instead, the social stigma against being 
religious gradually became a less intimidating factor for reporting a religious identity. 
In addition to studies that already existed in the literature, student interviews were 
analyzed for how they related to previous findings. The interviews were inspired in part by 
Fenggang Yang’s studies at Purdue, but they sought to discover a deeper understanding of the 
Chinese youth psyche as opposed to contributing additional statistics. The interviews supported 
many elements of the existing literature, first that science is still taught to be more important than 
religion, although religion is still taught as a subject. Furthermore, studies have shown that 
international students who are immersed in a diverse religious environment are more likely to be 
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tolerant of other religions, which was also supported by student interviews. Additionally, the 
disconnect between religious identity and belief was found in student interviews, which has been 
discovered in previous studies.  
A variety of analytical approaches were used to explain both the findings in the existing 
literature and responses from students. First, a historical analysis demonstrated that the desire of 
early Chinese scholars to secularize in order to modernize may still impact the mentality of 
Chinese people today. The traditional or Western view that religion is structured makes many 
Chinese people believe that they are not religious. This may be due to the fact that they do not 
identify as being a member of a given religion or that they may hold beliefs associated with 
multiple traditions. Furthermore, a psychological analysis was used to demonstrate that many of 
the interviewees supported Zhang’s proposal of a “psychological deficit” in Chinese college 
students being that many had interest in multiple religions and sought out religion for practical 
problems. Other socio-psychological analyses were used, which found that many religious or 
moral aspects of the main Chinese religious traditions have become embedded into the Chinese 
psyche, so that even if an individual says they are not religious, they may subconsciously hold 
beliefs associated with these traditions. Religious beliefs have become socially ingrained into 
Chinese culture, which has caused many Chinese people to grow up holding views that have 
religious elements to them. Overall, it was found that a combination of historical, political, and 
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